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Traditionally, strategy scholars have paid too little attention to epistemological issues. To 
advance our understanding of these issues, we focus in this paper on the theory of truth 
underlying specific traditions in strategy research. We distinguish positivism, constructionism, 
scientific realism, and pragmatism as viable, but fundamentally different epistemological 
approaches. We argue that each of these approaches is based on a specific theory of truth. As a 
case in point, we concentrate on the notion of competitive advantage, and argue that each of the 
four approaches attributes a specific epistemological status to competitive advantage that should 
be taken seriously when conducting empirical research and interpreting research findings. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Strategy research, a relatively young discipline, is characterized by a positivist tradition.
1 
This has meant that, with a few exceptions (Mir and Watson, 2000; Kwan and Tsang, 2001; 
Powell, 2001; Durand, 2002; Arend, 2003), there has been rather little discussion on the 
underlying ontological and epistemological assumptions in strategy research. Moreover, most of 
this discussion has focused on the juxtaposition of positivist and constructionist viewpoints (e.g. 
Mir and Watson, 2000; Kwan and Tsang, 2001), whereas other positions have received very little 
attention. On the whole, this discussion has so far remained at a fairly abstract level and not really 
focused on specific epistemological issues. 
It is therefore that we, coming from different traditions, focus in this paper on the theory 
of truth underlying specific epistemological approaches in strategy research. In brief, we argue 
that it is of fundamental importance to reflect on what kind of truth status is given to the research 
objects and findings in strategy research. We distinguish not only positivism and constructionism, 
but also present scientific realism and pragmatism as alternatives for strategy research. We argue 
that each of these approaches is based on a specific theory of truth: positivism on the 
correspondence theory of truth, constructionism on a coherence theory of truth, realism on a 
correspondence theory of truth, but a coherence theory of justification, and pragmatism on an 
instrumental theory of truth and a coherence theory of justification. As a case in point, we 
concentrate on the notion of competitive advantage, arguably one of the core concepts in strategy 
research. We argue that each of the four approaches attributes a specific epistemological status to 
competitive advantage that should be taken seriously when conducting empirical research and 
interpreting research findings. 
                                                 
1 A survey of the 33 published articles containing “competitive advantage” in their title published in Strategic 
Management Journal, Academy of Management Journal, and Organzation Science over the past ten years indicates 
that 27 belonged to the positivist tradition. 
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  The paper is structured as follows. We begin with a brief overview of different theories of 
truth which characterize specific epistemological approaches. We then review the four different 
epistemological approaches – positivism, constructionism, scientific realism, and pragmatism – 
that provide fundamentally different alternatives for strategy research. We then focus on 
competitive advantage as a case in point, illustrating that depending on the epistemological 
approach in question, we should understand competitive advantage in very different ways. We 
conclude this article by arguing that strategy researchers should recognize the epistemological 
implications of the positions taken; this is important not only for being able to understand what 
counts as valid knowledge in specific research traditions, but is also needed for consideration of 
how alternative research approaches add to our understanding of strategic phenomena. 
 
AN OVERVIEW OF THEORIES OF TRUTH 
By ‘theory of truth’, we refer in this article to two intertwined elements: (1) the underlying 
arguments that relate a concept to another, and (2) the conditions under which this relationship 
between two concepts can be said to be true or false for different epistemological postures. In a 
nutshell, we focus on the question of “what it means to claim that “A is related to B” is true.” 
Depending upon the approach, A can be an idea, a concept, a construct, and a mere word. The 
relationship can take the form of a causal relationship, a simple correlation, or a condition. 
Specific epistemological approaches tend to be based on particular theories of truth (e.g. 
Kirkham, 1992). For our purposes, it is important to point to the three central and fundamentally 
different theories: ‘correspondence’, ‘coherence’, and ‘instrumentalist’ theory. The classical 
theory of truth, the correspondence theory, can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle (e.g. 
McKeon, 1941). According to this view, truth means that statements and findings are true when 
they correspond with the ‘facts’ or ‘reality’. In philosophical discussions one can further 
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distinguish between correspondence as ‘correlation’ and correspondence as ‘congruence’ theories 
(e.g. Russell, 1912; Austin, 1950), but some kind of correspondence theory underlies positivistic 
and realistic stances in social sciences. Although this theory is close to a common sense 
understanding of truth, it has been heavily criticized both by philosophers and social scientists 
because of its naïve view of the nature of social facts or social reality and of the type of 
knowledge that we can have about social phenomena. 
Another major theory of truth is that of ‘coherence’. This theory originates from John 
Locke (1690/1976), and was further developed in the 20
th century (e.g. Blanshard, 1941). The 
key idea here is that a set of beliefs are said to cohere if they can fit together or agree with one 
another. This theory of truth underlies more or less clearly interpretation-oriented or constructed 
epistemologies in social science as these approaches question whether we can unproblematically 
study the ‘facts’ of social reality and emphasize the ‘constructed’ nature of social phenomena. 
A third major theory of truth has been developed by pragmatists, in particular James 
(1975a, 1975b). Here the focus is again different; the point is not correspondence, nor coherence, 
but the linkage between truth and action. According to this view, a statement counts as true only 
if the actions based on that belief lead in the long run to beneficial results for the believers. This 
theory is a fundamental basis for any pragmatist epistemology.
2
                                                 
2 It should be noted that all of these theories have as such been contested and per se do not seem to provide 
an altogether satisfying basis for a comprehensive theory of truth. This has led many philosophers to develop more 
sophisticated ideas such as ‘truthlikeness’ (e.g. Popper, 1963; Niiniluoto, 1987). Others have then developed 
alternative perspectives such as the ‘deflationary’ theories of truth (e.g. Ramsey, 1927). These perspectives argue 
that there is no such property as truth and thus no sense in developing theories distinguishing truth from truth 
ascriptions. Such theories are, however, not our concern here when mapping out fundamentally different kinds of 
epistemological approaches in strategy research. 
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FOUR DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO STRATEGY RESEARCH 
In this section, we distinguish four different epistemological approaches to strategy research. 
Table 1 below summarizes their main characteristics. 
- Insert Table 1 around here - 
The positivist perspective  
The roots of positivism can be traced back to 18
th century philosophers. However, it was 
in the mid 19
th century that Auguste Comte spelled out the basis of this epistemological stance. 
These ideas then led to a movement around logical positivism in the beginning of the last century 
that had a fundamental impact on modern epistemology. Positivist epistemology has thereafter 
become a cornerstone of modern social science, and has later spread over organization and 
management research and in particular strategy studies. 
  In brief, positivism is based on the ontological assumption that there is a reality 
independent of our observations or knowledge of it. For positivists, objects exist independently of 
our efforts to study them. Most positivists are also naturalists in that they see no fundamental 
difference between the natural and social sciences in this respect. They hold that reality can be 
studied and presented accurately by human knowledge. Furthermore, only the empirically 
validated knowledge counts as true knowledge. Positivists are thus strong supporters of the 
correspondence theory of truth, according to which the truth value of specific arguments and 
research findings is dependent on how well these claims correspond to the “reality out there.” In 
fact, positivists can be seen as advocates of the strong version of the correspondence theory of 
truth; what counts as true knowledge is only something that is clearly validated by empirical 
research. For research in strategy, this position means that organizations have specific structures 
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and resources, that they pursue particular strategies, and that they can possess at times a 
competitive advantage that explains superior performance. These features are seen as real 
existing objects that one can observe and study in a relatively straightforward manner. 
  The positivist perspective has its limitations. First, the status of ‘negative facts’ is a 
central problem. Positivism relies on positive facts, that is, observable facts that can be coherently 
associated with theoretical propositions. . This is problematic because in some instance, the 
absence of something seems to have important consequences. Durand (2002), for example, has 
discussed whether the absence of a competitive advantage is a competitive disadvantage and 
reflected upon the ontological status of competitive disadvantage. Similarly, Trevino and Weaver 
(2003, :331) underscore that a limit to positivist approaches of organizational ethics is that “one 
of the major challenges of studying business ethics is that success is often evidenced by the 
“absence” of unethical or illegal conduct; but empirical researchers generally wish to account for 
increases in some phenomenon. It is difficult to explain variance in something that is absent.” 
Second, there are also empirical and methodological problems related to the direction of 
causality and reciprocal effects between, for instance, an ability and performance. Explanations 
concerning financial performance are a good illustration, as they often assume unidirectional 
causal effects. However, as March and Sutton (1997) argue, financial performance may be a 
consequence, but also an explanation for all kinds of behaviours. 
Third, positivism is confronted with the question of the double hermeneutic, that is, the 
phenomena under study have already been conceptualized. In strategy studies, we are not dealing 
only with natural reality, but also with people’s values, beliefs and interpretations regarding what 
constitutes for instance ‘strategy’ or ‘competitive advantage’, which is then reflected in their 
behavior. In fact, people did not really talk about strategy or competitive advantage or develop 
particular strategic planning or management practices in organizations before this discourse 
  6A true competitive advantage? 
gained popularity, linked with the emergence of strategy studies, in the 1960s. Many of the 
phenomena that are being studied in strategy research can thus be seen as essentially social 
constructions – not ‘naturalistic’ objects of study. This is of course not unique for strategy 
research, but something that also characterizes other sciences. Ferraro, Pfeffer, and Sutton (2005) 
warn us against the risk of self-fulfilling theories in economics. These theories shape institutional 
designs and practices as well as social norms and expectations, and thereby create the behaviour 
they predict. Similarly, in the area of finance, MacKenzie & Millo (2003) have shown that it was 
the development of option pricing theory (the CAPM model and the diffusion of Black & 
Scholes’ formulas) that allowed options traders to value option prices, spreads, and underlying 
assets, giving birth to new financial professions and institutions, attesting in return the validity of 
the option pricing theory. 
The constructionist approaches 
The roots of constructionism can be traced to the work of Wittgenstein and others during 
the ‘linguistic turn’ of social science. However, it was especially the work by Berger and 
Luckmann (1966) on the social construction of reality that made this label famous. Thereafter, we 
can see constructionist thinking being embraced by a great variety of philosophers and scientists 
in various disciplines. Especially the work on sociological theory (Berger and Luckmann, 1966) 
and the discussions on the sociology of science (Knorr-Cretina, 1983; Latour and Woolgar, 1989) 
have been influential in shaping the constructionist epistemology. 
  While there are many versions of constructionism – shown also in the use of the terms 
constructivism and constructionism to sometimes denote the differences – there are some central 
assumptions that most constructionists share. A key assumption is the idea that our knowledge of 
the world – and thus of organizations and strategies – is produced or invented in social processes 
  7A true competitive advantage? 
where in particular linguistic elements play a key role. This is especially the case with research 
efforts, characterized by theory-ladenness and the need to justify and legitimate the claims vis-à-
vis specific traditions and in particular communities. A part of this is a strong belief in the 
coherence theory of truth, which means that the truth status of any conception, statement, 
argument, or research finding is dependent on its coherence with generally held beliefs and 
values. This does not mean that one could not produce contradictory research findings or invent 
new ideas, but that these are indeed produced in a specific social setting and built on the basis of 
existing ideas, traditions and values – many of which we are unaware of. 
  A clear methodological implication of this is the emphasis on reflexivity, that is, 
continuous and critical evaluation of how one’s own viewpoints, conceptualizations and methods 
influence or even create the phenomena under scrutiny (see e.g. Alvesson, 2003). This is seen as 
a particular challenge in social studies where a researcher is not only dealing with the research 
community but also with the social setting under study. A special emphasis is here usually paid to 
different interpretations, implying both a challenge to point out ‘multiple realities’ and a need to 
emphasize that one’s own interpretations are fallible and often only one possibility among many 
others. 
  While constructionism is thus very clearly positioned vis-à-vis epistemology, ambiguous 
and even radically different views exist among constructionists on the nature of its underlying 
ontology. In the strategy field, for example, Mir and Watson (2000) have argued that 
constructionists share ontological realism and epistemological relativism. However, this is in our 
view not the case for most constructionists. In fact, as Kwan and Tsang (2001) have pointed out, 
this kind of position is the basis for scientific realism, which we will return to in the next section. 
For our purposes, it is most useful to distinguish ‘moderate’ and ‘radical’ constructionism, 
although this distinction is somewhat simplistic. In any case, moderate constructionism tends to 
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give social objects – such as organizational structures, processes and mechanisms – a clear 
ontological status as socially constituted elements. This differs from the positivist and also 
scientific realist viewpoints in that these social constructions are not seen as stable or ever-
present structures, but as something that exist during at historical time-points in specific 
communities. In strategy research, historical analyses (e.g. Pettigrew, 1973), and reflections 
around emergent strategies (Mintzberg, 1994) or social practices associated with strategizing (e.g. 
Whittington, 1992; Johnson et al., 2003) seem to reflect this kind of thinking. Yet even these 
researchers have rarely openly subscribed to the constructionist epistemology. As we will argue 
in the next section, their position might be even better characterized by scientific realism. 
  Radical constructionism in turn goes a step further and emphasizes the discursive nature 
of any of these phenomena. This perspective is close to the post-modern or post-structuralist 
philosophical and sociological movements, inspired, for example, by Derrida’s or Foucault’s 
work (Derrida, 1976; Foucault, 1973). In brief, this means that strategies or notions such as 
competitive advantage are essentially discursive productions, created not only in specific 
communities in organizations, but more generally in our society; for example, by the media or by 
us strategy scholars. There are also recent examples of such constructionist analyses, 
conceptualising strategies as narrative or discursive constructions (Knights and Morgan, 1991; 
Barry and Elmes, 1997; Hendry, 2000; Lilley, 2001; Samra-Fredericks, 2003; Vaara et al., 2004). 
According to this view, strategies and notions such as competitive advantage also bring with 
them heavy historical baggage in terms of reflecting and reproducing specific values and 
hegemonies. However, as these discourses are naturalized, we are usually not aware of these 
linkages, even if they have very significant power implications. From this perspective, like 
Knights and Morgan (1991) suggest, we can study strategy as a discourse that is closely linked, 
for example, with militarism and masculine hegemony. 
  9A true competitive advantage? 
  Neither is constructionism unproblematic as an epistemological stance. Most of the 
philosophical critique focuses on the dangers of ontological relativism, that is, on tendencies not 
to specify what kind of ontological status one gives to the socially constructed reality (or multiple 
realities) under scrutiny. Another limitation of constructionism concerns the coherence principle, 
fundamental for the definition of truth. Indeed, a completely forged story can be coherent enough 
not to be self-contradictory. The coherence of a proposition vis-à-vis a theoretical context, what 
some scholars have qualified as the Duhem-Quine principle, raises the problem of the passage 
from subjectivism to objectivism, and the legacy of a knowledge confined to individuals –and not 
sharable by larger communities. Indeed, is a coherent series of propositions inter-subjectively 
accepted by a community, a scientific theory? What makes a theory a scientific theory when the 
theory of truth is based on coherence, and not on correspondence with sufficient materiality? This 
has led many, such as scientific realists, to search for new epistemological formulations that 
could integrate some form of meaningful ontological realism and epistemological 
constructionism. 
Scientific realism as an alternative 
Scientific realism, emerging in the 1970s, can be seen as an attempt to develop an 
alternative to positivism and constructionism. We can distinguish different currents in this 
literature such as scientific realism (Hull, 1988; Bunge, 2001), or critical realism (Bhaskar, 1975, 
1979; Harré and Madden, 1975). This perspective has also received increasing interest in 
organization and management research (e.g. Tsoukas, 1989; Tsang and Kwan, 1999; Ackroyd 
and Fleetwood, 2000, 2004; Fleetwood, 2004). 
  Realists believe in transcendental reality, meaning that we must analytically distinguish 
empirical (observable phenomena), actual (events that take place) and real (underlying structures, 
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processes and mechanisms) domains. Realism argues that a constant conjunction of events is 
neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for the manifestation of a causal law. Neither 
positivism nor constructionism (positivist and hermeneutical traditions in Bhaskar’s terms) 
“doubts for a moment that empirical invariances are necessary for law, or that the conceptual and 
the empirical jointly exhaust the real” (Bhaskar, 1979:17). By believing in the existence of the 
real domain independent of our observation or knowledge of it, realists (as the name implies) 
subscribe to the correspondence theory of truth. However, we as researchers have a direct access 
only to the empirical, not to the real level. This means that our knowledge of the world is partial. 
This is one of the key differences vis-à-vis positivism that tends to ignore these problems in 
research efforts (e.g. Fleetwood, 2004). 
  For scientific realists, the deepest level of understanding requires both theoretical analysis 
and empirical studies focusing on the underlying structures and mechanisms. As Harré (1970, 
:125) puts it: “Scientific explanation consists in finding or imagining plausible generative 
mechanisms for the patterns amongst events.” Realists are accordingly much more favorable 
towards methodologies that are not based on attempts to discover law-like regularities. 
Conceptual work as well as case studies are, in fact, often favored by realists (e.g. Sayer, 1992; 
Tsoukas, 1989). 
  In several respects, as Kwan and Tsang (2001) have shown, moderate constructionist and 
scientific realist perspectives can be quite close to another. The essential difference seems to be 
the ontological status given to the social processes producing social phenomena. A qualified 
version of realism, which seems aceptable for most people, is to state that many social 
phenomena may indeed be socially constructed (their existence depends on people’s knowledge 
of them) but exist independently of the specific researcher studying these phenomena. This is 
consistent with stating that the realists believe in the correspondence theory of truth (world and 
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also social objects exist independently of our knowledge of it), but in a coherence theory of 
justification (this knowledge is legitimate in specific communities) (Maki, 1990).  
  Realism poses restrictions of its own. Difficulties in eventually accessing the causal 
powers and generative mechanisms are numerous and raise the question of the accurate value of 
our current knowledge. Events can result from the combination of causes, some being effective 
and others impaired by countervailing mechanisms. Disentangling in observable and actual 
phenomena the effective causal powers from the ineffective mechanisms requires demanding 
analytical and methodological capabilities. Furthermore, the realist epistemology does not seem 
to provide the means to reflect upon the role of the researcher in specific research projects or the 
implications of particular interventions, which are central methodological issues in strategy 
research. Finally, realism may appear to some as minimizing the role of institutional logics and 
values, being another version of materialism. 
Pragmatism as another alternative 
Pragmatism, in turn, is a philosophical approach that emphasizes the pragmatic nature and 
value of knowledge. While there are different versions of pragmatism, American pragmatists 
James (1975a) and Dewey (1988) are usually seen as the founding fathers. More recently 
especially the ideas of Rorty (1989) have inspired social scientists, among them organization and 
management scholars (e.g. Wicks and Freeman, 1998, Czarniawska, 1999).  
  For pragmatists, any object of study is a historical and social artefact. Pragmatism 
characterizes a social construction of the world determined by the sense people give to concepts 
and their sensations, expectations, and beliefs about the value of both knowledge and the inquiry 
process. “To attain perfect cleanness in our thoughts of an object, we need only consider what 
conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve – what sensations we are to expect 
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from it, and what reactions we must prepare” (James, 1975b: 18). Pragmatists do not distinguish 
‘truth’ and ‘justification’ as separate issues in epistemology. In many ways, pragmatists share the 
key ideas of constructionists, for example, in rejecting the correspondence theory of truth. 
Pragmatists are sceptical towards efforts aiming at the discovery and development of nomothetic 
(law-like) knowledge. Along with constructionists, pragmatists emphasize the social processes in 
knowledge production and the coherence theory of justification. However, it is the explicit focus 
of pragmatism on an instrumental theory of truth that distinguishes them from constructionists. 
Knowledge is true when it is useful, for example, for social action. This implies a stance 
according to which the value of specific concepts, models or research findings is dependent on 
whether they are useful vehicles helping to better understand or manage specific social or 
organizational processes. 
Like constructionism, pragmatism can be challenged on the grounds of its (usually) 
unclear position vis-à-vis correspondence and reality. In fact, pragmatists tend to reject any 
specified ontology (Powell, 2003). However, the critics argue that to be of practical value or 
useful is likely to be linked with some kind of correspondence with reality. Another fundamental 
liability of pragmatism is its relativism vis-à-vis different versions of reality. As Huber and 
Mirosky (1997) put it, “Does every version of an event have as much validity as every other 
version? This last question is crucial because if the answer is yes, then scientific confirmation or 
replication is pointless […] The belief that social research is only one of many possible narratives 
takes sociologists altogether out of the business of trying to gather valid data. What would be the 
point?” (1997 :1426 and 1428). A core weakness of pragmatism is therefore the inability to 
weigh the utility of different ideas, concepts, and propositions against each other. 
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COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE  
As a case in point, we now turn to competitive advantage, a construct that has become an 
essential part of strategy as a body of knowledge and practice. In the following paragraphs, we 
discuss how each of these epistemological positions implies a different ontology and a distinctive 
status for the knowledge created around the concept of competitive advantage. We also consider 
some important methodological implications of these different positions. Table 2 below 
summarizes the characteristics of each of these perspectives. 
- Insert Table 2 around here - 
Positivist advantage  
From the positivist perspective, competitive advantage is a real industrial and 
organizational phenomenon related to specific resources and structures. For example, according 
to the resource-based view, competitive advantage results from the combination of several 
conditions that enable an organization to appropriate extra-revenues from its idiosyncratic 
resources relative to comparable rivals. Peteraf (1993) distinguishes four pillars that render 
possible the extraction of rents from certain resources: firm heterogeneity, ex post limits to 
competition, imperfect mobility of factors, and ex ante limits to competition. Resource qualities 
that characterize the resource as strategic, that is, entailing the presence of a competitive 
advantage, are: scarce, unique, appropriable, valuable, difficult to substitute, and difficult to 
imitate. If these conditions are met, competitive advantage exists, is real, and is shown in superior 
financial performance. 
While most of the studies on competitive advantage have followed the positivist approach, 
this perspective is not epistemologically unproblematic. On the one hand, there are conceptual 
challenges related to the ontology of competitive advantage. In simple terms, if competitive 
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advantage is created in specific conditions by the combination of specific resources and is then 
reflected in superior financial performance, the whole concept seems redundant. In other words, 
we can explain the superior performance directly with the specific combination of particular 
resources. The obvious counter-argument is that getting rid of this concept would significantly 
undermine the ability of researchers to conceive and discuss these issues. Indeed, competitive 
advantage is a useful concept. It should be noted, however, that this kind of view is not 
compatible with a strict positivist viewpoint, but more in line with constructionist or pragmatist 
positions. 
On the other hand, there are methodological challenges in positivist research efforts (e.g. Wiggins 
and Rueffli, 2002). According to the positivist methodology, the existence of a true competitive 
advantage in specific settings requires empirical analyses verifying the key causal relationships. 
Here, we are dealing with a complex causal chain: industrial conditions – resource properties – 
competitive advantage – superior performance (e.g. Cockburn, Henderson and Stern, 2000). 
Consequently, it is not an easy task to establish any of the key causal relationships in particular 
settings. A strict association of competitive advantage with superior financial performance is 
particularly problematic, since financial performance is for some authors merely the reflect of 
differentials in initial resource distributions (Stinchcombe, 2000). Therefore, to exist, positivist 
advantage should relate initial resource endowments with managers’ ability to respond to 
environmental challenges (Cockburn et al., 2000). This implies that studies on competitive 
advantage have to consider also ‘less positive facts’ such as managers’ perceptions. 
Constructionist advantage 
Taking a constructionist perspective on competitive advantage means a completely 
different kind of approach. Here, competitive advantage is seen as a social or discursive 
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construction. Ontologically, this means an understanding according to which competitive 
advantage is not something ‘real,’ but a phenomenon created in particular social settings. A 
moderate constructionist position is to focus on the various kinds of social processes and 
practices around competitive advantage, while a more radical position implies seeing competitive 
advantage merely as a fashionable concept in contemporary discourse. 
The moderate constructionist position favors studying, for example, how specific actors in 
particular companies make sense of competitive advantage or related phenomena and how this is 
linked with their actions. This type of analysis results in an understanding of how different actors 
see the company and which kinds of actions they are likely to take when developing the 
competitiveness of the organization. Such studies can also go further and examine the 
performative effects of social constructions such as stories or charisma. For example, Lounsbury 
and Glynn (2001) have shown how professional entrepreneurs are able to construct convincing 
stories about their future business and garner resources in excess relative to other similar 
companies. Similarly, Flynn and Staw (2004) have demonstrated how the leader’s charisma may 
favourably impact observers’ appreciation of a company’s potential. 
The more radical constructionist approach focuses on the discourse around competitive 
advantage in specific organizations, media or even in the academic literature. This kind of 
discursive approach can involve an openly manifested critical approach (Knights and Morgan, 
1991; Levy et al., 2003). In practice, such analyses can examine how competitive advantage, 
rather than some other concept, has become a dominant way of conceptualizing industrial 
competition and an explicit objective for companies and other organizations. This may mean 
analyses focusing on the legitimating and naturalization strategies in the discourses around 
competitive advantage as well as more ideological reflections concerning the values and moral 
orders that this particular concept promotes. The need for reflexivity is especially important in 
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such studies and poses particular challenges for the researchers who are themselves part of the 
discourses around competitive advantage. 
The constructionist position implies a need to reflect on the researcher’s own conceptions 
about these phenomena. Indeed, both the general theories, models and discourses around 
competitive advantage and the particular viewpoints and values of the researcher need to be taken 
into account in the analysis. Particular methodological challenges include, for example, not 
taking the official rhetoric of the company at face value, not influencing the natural discourses of 
the actors by putting words into their mouths, and being able to deal with marginalized voices in 
specific organizational settings. 
Here, we emphasize that a constructionist perspective helps us to understand the socially 
and discursively constructed nature of competitive advantage but does not focus on the more 
material processes in organizations competing in different arenas. Studying at the same time the 
more discursive and the more material aspects of competitive advantage requires, in fact, either a 
qualified version of constructionism or an epistemological position close to scientific realism. 
Realist advantage  
For realists, competitive advantage is a mechanism that enables firms to outperform 
rivals. In this sense this perspective echoes that of the positivists. There are, however, important 
differences. First, the transcendental ontology of the realists implies a focus on the generative 
structures and mechanisms. Here, competitive advantage is seen as a mechanism linking 
underlying industrial structures and resource combinations at the real domain level with the 
observable outcomes such as financial performance at the empirical level. According to this view, 
we can rarely, however, observe the clear-cut effects from specific resource combinations to 
financial performance because there are a variety of other causal processes and mechanisms at 
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play. This does not undermine the significance of the competitive advantage causal mechanism, 
but manifests a different kind of view on causality that is not based on regularities as in 
positivism (e.g. Hume, 1955), but analytically sensible to causal powers and mechanisms (e.g. 
Harré and Madden, 1975).  Second, the realist perspective emphasizes the fallibility of 
researchers’ knowledge. This implies, at least in principle, a critical attitude towards our 
conceptions and theories and an understanding that the concepts and models that researchers 
utilize may be poor or underdeveloped when it comes to their ability to accurately describe and 
explain important organizational phenomena. 
As discussed above, the realist position can well examine the social structures and 
processes that do or do not create specific conceptions of competitive advantage and the people’s 
viewpoints, that is, the actual manifestations of competitive advantage. In fact, especially the 
more critical versions of realism emphasize the role of societal, industrial and organizational 
structures in the creation of specific conceptions – true or false. Note that to focus on these more 
social and even discursive aspects of competitive advantage does not mean undermining the real 
nature of competitive advantage in the realist framework. While the realist position 
accommodates some moderate constructionist insights, there is a limit to the capacity of the clear-
cut realist position to embrace constructionist ideas. Although the realist epistemology is by its 
very nature open and flexible, the underlying correspondence theory of truth is at odds with more 
radical constructionist perspectives influenced by post-structuralism. Hence, it would be 
impossible for a scientific realist to agree with the radical constructionists that competitive 
advantage is merely a discursive fashion or fiction with no material implications. 
This ontological-epistemological position is, however, not unproblematic as it involves an 
in-built challenge concerning the status of competitive advantage in specific settings. Is it an 
underlying generative mechanism of performance, an observable phenomenon, or an evanescent 
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event? Researchers cannot directly observe the underlying structures, processes, and mechanisms 
at play, and therefore we may wonder whether they can offer more than superficial descriptions 
of competitive advantage. 
Pragmatist advantage 
Finally, the pragmatist perspective on competitive advantage considers the knowledge 
around this concept as something that can be of practical value – either in research, public debate, 
teaching, organizational action, or management. Underlying this view is a relativist position not 
far from the constructionists. However, what is essential here is the explicit focus on the 
instrumental or practical value of the competitive advantage. Powell (2001, 2002) explains this as 
follows: “The search for competitive advantage relies for its epistemological justification not on 
correspondence or coherence theories, but on an instrumentalist theory of truth. Under this 
approach […] empirical states of affairs are indifferent to our propositions about them –they are 
neither true not false, but simply, are” (Powell, 2001,:884). According to this view, truth is 
demoted to an instrument, and causality is a meaningful and useful association between concepts 
which are somehow connected to reality. In the context of competitive advantage, financial 
performance is the key objective against which the usefulness of the discourse on competitive 
advantage should be measured. However, this objective may also be broader, such as overall 
organizational success when considering a variety of stakeholders (Wicks and Freeman, 1988). 
In any case, the pragmatist stance is very close to the practical and action-oriented 
tradition in strategy research focusing on competitive advantage. A fundamental goal for most 
strategy scholars – not to speak of consultants, other experts or managers – seems to be the 
creation of knowledge that is useful for companies and other organizations and which can 
specifically improve their performance. To put it bluntly, the positivist types of knowledge 
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focusing on abstract patterns and causal relationships is not the kind of knowledge that is usually 
seen as particularly useful by practitioners. Neither does the constructionist emphasis on social 
constructions and discourses appear to be very practical. Nor are the transcendental subtleties of 
the scientific realists likely to arouse managers’ interests. 
As the pragmatist position diffuses in strategy research, knowledge created in cooperation 
with specific companies - e.g. in action research or specific types of consulting - can be given a 
new kind of status (e.g. Argyris, 1996).
3 However, the relativistic twist contained in the 
pragmatist position poses challenges for people pursuing this agenda. In particular, by discarding 
the idea that competitive advantage would be a ‘real’ feature of organizations in any traditional 
sense, the pragmatist position may prove hard to accept by many strategy scholars. Morever, the 
inherent context-specific instrumentalism of pragmatism is also at odds with the transferability 
and accumulation of more general knowledge in strategy research. 
 
DISCUSSION 
With notable exceptions (Mir and Watson, 2000; Kwan and Tsang, 2001; Powell, 2001; 
Durand, 2002; Arend, 2003), there has been insufficient ontological and epistemological 
reflection in strategy research. While we are not saying that all strategy scholars must engage in 
this kind of reflection or position themselves vis-à-vis different schools of thought, a lack of 
epistemological discussion is in several ways problematic for our discipline. First, a lack of 
discussion on the underlying theories of truth, more or less consciously adopted by strategy 
scholars, prevents everyone from engaging in more in-depth reflections concerning what kind of 
knowledge strategy research is producing, what its limitations are, and who it is for. This, if not 
anything else, makes it difficult to build bridges between other disciplines and see strategy 
                                                 
3 Interestingly, the general theme for the 2004 Academy of Management Annual Meeting was ‘actionable 
knowledge’ – a perspective very much in line with the pragmatist tradition. 
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research as an area in social science that is not only open to new ideas, but also has something to 
offer to others. Second, a lack of such reflection sustains traditional conceptions of research and 
practice. It is often the case that when new ideas and approaches are introduced, their justification 
and legitimization is, if not impossible, at least difficult. To this end, it is especially important to 
outline alternative epistemological approaches and positions that can provide a sound and 
legitimate basis for specific kinds of research efforts. Third, a lack of epistemological reflection 
is especially problematic if it leads to ignorance or misunderstandings. Without pointing fingers 
at anyone, not all cherishing positivism are fully cognizant of the reductionist assumptions proper 
to this approach. Similarly, not all calling themselves as constructionists or pragmatists are fully 
aware of the underlying relativism associated with their postures. 
We have in this paper concentrated on positivism, constructionism, scientific realism, and 
pragmatism as alternative epistemological approaches to strategy research. We have in particular 
focused on the key differences around what constitutes truth and knowledge in research and used 
competitive advantage as the touchstone to highlight key differences between these approaches. 
First, the positivist approach lies upon a correspondence theory of truth that assumes that we can 
empirically observe real structures, processes and mechanisms – such as competitive advantage - 
and validate their existence. According to this approach, strategy research advances primarily by 
discovering empirically verifiable laws and then confirming the causal interrelationships through 
rigorous scientific tests. The question for positivistic research therefore becomes the following: 
why and under which conditions does a competitive advantage lead to superior performance? 
Second, the constructionist approach emphasizes that the social world does not exist 
independently of our observations or knowledge of it. A cornerstone of constructionist thinking is 
the coherence theory of truth according to which our claims, concepts, and research findings are 
seen as true only to the extent to which they conform to the generally held beliefs and values. 
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When it comes to competitive advantage, the moderate constructionists are interested in the 
various kinds of social processes through which ideas and conceptions concerning competitive 
advantage are created. In these processes, these constructions (e.g. views concerning proper ways 
to improve one’s competitiveness) can also become constitutive elements of the social reality and 
thus have a fundamental effect on how the company actually performs vis-à-vis others. The 
research question for moderate constructionists can thus be formulated as follows: how do social 
actors make sense and construct competitive advantage in specific settings? 
According to a more radical version, these discourses are, in fact, the essential elements of 
the phenomena we study. These discourses define what is legitimate and normal and thus have all 
kinds of power implications. The question implied by radical constructionist research can thus be 
stated as follows: how and why has competitive advantage become a widespread concept in 
strategy research and practice and what are its social implications? 
Third, scientific realism is by and large based on a realist ontology and a constructionist 
epistemology. This means an acceptance of the correspondence theory of truth but at the same 
time an appreciation of the essentially constructionist processes in knowledge production, 
implying a coherence theory of justification. However, for scientific realists there are limits to 
these constructions; in particular, there are structures, processes and mechanisms that exist 
independent of our knowledge of them. From the realist perspective, organizations are constituted 
of specific resources and competitive advantage results form the actualization of the potential 
residing in these resources. However, these effects are not always easy to observe because of the 
effects of opposing causal mechanisms. The challenge for realists thus becomes to clarify the 
status of claimed competitive advantage in specific settings; is it an underlying generative 
mechanism of performance, an observable phenomenon, or an evanescent event? For scientific 
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realists, the research question thus becomes the following: what are the causal powers and 
mechanisms related to competitive advantage? 
Finally, pragmatism is on the whole based on an instrumental theory of truth and a social 
constructionist epistemology. This approach legitimates any research efforts that deal with 
practical problems related to competitive advantage. This alternative provides room for a variety 
of different research approaches, but stresses the context-specificity of any knowledge. In this 
framework, competitive advantage has a status of a potentially valuable concept to be used in 
practical reflections around strategy. The point is not to debate over the ontological status of 
competitive advantage but rather to examine and use it as a way to advance our knowledge and 
help managerial decision-making. The research question becomes the following: how can 
competitive advantage be used as an instrumental concept in research and practice? 
While knowledge of the different epistemological alternatives is important, we are not 
saying that every strategy scholar should choose between pre-defined approaches. In fact, some 
of the recent discussions among strategy scholars have implied that strategy researchers should 
choose between a realist-positivist or a constructionist camp (Mir and Watson, 2000; Kwan and 
Tsang, 2001; Mir and Watson, 2001; Arend, 2003). What we have tried to argue in this paper is 
that this is not as simple as that. Scientific realism offers a common-sense epistemology to which 
most researchers could probably subscribe much more easily than to radical positivism or radical 
constructionism. Pragmatism, in turn, has appealing characteristics as it values usable concepts 
and theories and thus fits the pragmatic tradition in strategy research and literature. These are, 
however, not the only alternatives available. There are also particular versions of these 
approaches that we have not been able to highlight due to space considerations. We have not 
either singled out specific positions within these different approaches such as particular kinds of 
post-structuralism within the constructionist camp (see e.g. Levy et al., 2003).  
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In conclusion, we want to stress that examining the different epistemological approaches 
available helps us to clarify the basis for any particular research project, and justify and 
legitimate the methods used. Paying attention to the differences in the underlying assumptions 
about truth also makes us better see the limits of any particular approach. Consequently, 
epistemological reflections help all us strategy scholars to advance the knowledge of our field 
and accumulate findings. 
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TABLES 
 












theory of truth 





Focus on corresponding 




Coherence theory of 
truth 
Research objects are 
social and discursive 
constructions; 
They are either socially 
constituted objects or the 
inventions of researchers 
Various methods of 
social analysis; 
discourse analysis plays 
a central role; 




theory of truth; 
coherence theory of 
justification 
Research objects exist and 
are real; 
we cannot observe or 
study them directly; 
our knowledge is fallible 
Theoretical reflection 
and empirical research 
of various kinds; 






coherence theory of 
justification 
Useful concepts that may 
help us to better 
understand or manage 
organizations; 
our knowledge is 
particular (not easily 
generalizable) 
Focus on common sense 
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TABLE 2. Different approaches to competitive advantage 
 
 Epistemological 
status of competitive 
advantage 
Legitimate research objectives 
Positivism 
 
An object to study  Construction of empirically validated models 
revealing the causal relationships between 





A social and 
discursive 
construction 
Analysis of how social actors make sense and 
construct competitive advantage in specific 
settings 
 
Analysis of the legitimization and naturalization 
of competitive advantage and the ideological 




A causal mechanism   Analysis of the generative mechanisms creating 






A concept of potential 
pragmatic value 
Analysis of how the notion of competitive 
advantage can contribute to knowledge creation 
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